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ABSTRACT 
Contests with Multi-Tasking  
by Derek Clark and Kai A. Konrad * 
The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension 
is well understood and documented. Multi-dimension extensions are possible 
but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one 
of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we propose an extension in 
which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a 
certain number of these is awarded a prize. The amount of information needed 
to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each 
player. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of 
maximizing effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), and show that there 
will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions. The standard 
Tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework. 
 
Keywords: contest design, multi-tasking, effort incentives 
JEL Classification: D72 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Contests with Multi-Tasking 
Die Arbeit untersucht Wettbewerbsstrukturen, in denen die Teilnehmer eines 
Turniers in mehr als einer beobachtbaren Dimension oder Outputgröße mit-
einander konkurrieren, und in denen ein Wettbewerber einen Preis gewinnt, 
wenn er hinsichtlich einer vorgegebenen Anzahl von Dimensionen besser als 
seine Konkurrenten abschneidet. Es zeigt sich dabei, dass ein Turnierveranstal-
ter, der die Anstrengungen der Turnierteilnehmer maximieren möchte, Turniere 
mit einer kleinen Anzahl von Outputdimensionen bevorzugen sollte. 
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draft, and especially Espen Sirnes for performing the numerical simulations. Clark acknowledges 
financial support from the Research Council of Norway (Project 172603/V10) and Konrad 
acknowledges support by the German Science Foundation (DFG grant SFB-TR-15). Errors are our 
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I. Introduction 
In many areas, including lobbying, internal labor markets, promotional competition, 
political campaigns, sports, litigation, international conflict and war and in many areas of 
biology, situations are characterized by one or several prizes that are allocated among a 
set of players as a function of the players’ costly efforts. Such games have been called 
conflicts, tournaments, all-pay auctions, or wars, and the common underlying structure 
has been studied intensively.1 Some more recent contributions focus on the problem of 
how such games should be designed if the designer pursues certain objectives. The role 
of the different types of contest success functions and reward functions (Kräkel 2003), 
the size of the prize, multiple prizes and their optimal structure (Clark and Riis 1998, 
Moldovanu and Sela 2001, 2006), resource constraints (Che and Gale 1997), spending 
limits (Che and Gale 1998), the contestants’ choice of points of aspiration and the 
incentive to moderate their conflicting demands (Epstein and Nitzan 2004), timing (Baik 
and Shogren 1992, Leininger 1993), the role of fee-shifting rules in litigation contests 
(Farmer and Pecorino 1999, Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 2005), the role of tournaments 
with multiple, more complex structures (Amegashie 1999 and Gradstein and Konrad 
1999) have been analysed. Related to this, researchers in industrial organization and in 
political economy have considered questions of sequential contests in which the same 
contestants interact repeatedly. In the industrial organization context, early influential 
work is by Harris and Vickers (1985, 1987) and Budd, Harris and Vickers (1993) who 
considered two structures of repeated contests, the race, and the tug-of-war. In the first 
type, the number of single-stage contests is finite and the prize is awarded to the 
contestant who first wins a certain threshold of single-stage contests. In the tug-of-war, 
the number of single-stage contests is possibly infinite, and the tug-of-war ends if one 
contestant has gained a sufficiently large advantage. Konrad and Kovenock (2005) 
consider the tug-of-war in the context of all-pay auctions and offer complete solutions to 
the problem. Klumpp and Polborn (2006) consider the primaries in the U.S. presidential 
elections. They focus on the sequential nature of this process, and compare it with 
simultaneous contests in several states. The sequential nature causes considerable 
dynamics in terms of spending levels in the sequence of elections.  
                                                 
1 In the context of lobbying, some selective surveys are Nitzan (1994) and Lockard and Tullock (2001).  
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In a standard contest, participants are invited to try to win a prize of fixed value by 
making an irretrievable effort or outlay, with the winner being determined by a contest 
success function. The advantages and disadvantages of tournaments compared to a 
standard principal-agent contract are well understood in the context in which agents 
spend effort along one dimension only, and are surveyed by Kräkel (2004) who 
introduces limited liability as a further dimension along which standard contracts and 
tournaments should be compared. Generally, non-verifiability of output and the 
contractual problems for the principal that this may generate, systematic noise, or limits 
to the comparability of outputs on an ordinal scale are known to be main reasons that may 
make tournaments, or relative reward schemes more generally, superior to other, standard 
incentive mechanisms. Their wide use (see Lazear 1996 and Kräkel 2004 for discussions 
of examples) in firms, sports and other contexts suggests that the conditions for their 
superiority are often met.  
Our paper considers a particular aspect of contest design: in many situations the number 
of prizes that can be awarded is much smaller than the number of dimensions along 
which contestants compete with each other. The prize(s) must be awarded as a function 
of the outcomes of a larger number of contests or tournaments, one for each of several 
tasks of similar importance, such that the contest designer or principal knows in how 
many tasks each player performed better than his competitor. When opening up the 
contest for several effort dimensions, Franckx et al. (2004) note that one risks losing one 
of the main advantages of this type of incentive mechanism, namely its simplicity. If the 
principal has access to data from several dimensions, then it is not obvious how this 
should be combined to determine the contest winner. Franckx et al. (2004) sum up the 
efforts in each dimension and then add a series of shocks to the output signal in the spirit 
of Lazear and Rosen (1981). Our analysis is close in spirit, and in simplicity, to the 
standard Tullock (rent-seeking) contest (Tullock, 1980). The principal has information 
only on the number of dimensions won by each contestant, but not the size of the winning 
margin. Hence effort aggregation is not an option. 
This contest literature concentrates on problems in which the agents perform a single task, 
or, where performance is measured along one dimension. In many organizational 
 3
problems, agents have to decide about their overall effort, and how to allocate this effort 
between different tasks. Often, the competitors will be rewarded according to some 
aggregate measure of overall performance, and not rewarded for performance in each 
task. The water regulating authority in the UK, OFWAT, has used price cap regulation to 
drive efficient water and sewerage provision, and have adopted eight improvement 
criteria for drinking water quality. Those water authorities that are significantly better 
than the industry average have been allowed a price limit increase of 0.5% (OFWAT, 
1999). Hence the prize can be thought of as being awarded to the winner of the majority 
of these criteria, and this is a case captured by our model. The importance of multi-
tasking, and the problems this causes in the context of principal-agent theory was first 
formally studied by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Principals may want agents to 
spend effort along several dimensions and to pursue several goals, whereas the 
correlation between input or output along these different dimensions need not be equal, 
and they need not be equally well observable or contractible.  
The problem of multi-tasking may also come together with one or several of the 
contractual problems that make a contest or tournament the appropriate incentive tool. 
The agents may compete along several dimensions, providing several types of effort that 
generate several types of output, and the contest designer may need to decide about the 
structure of prizes as a function of relative performance along this set of outputs. If each 
type of effort leads to one different type of output, compared to the problem of the choice 
of the structure of prizes when contestants compete along one dimension, a tournament 
designer can essentially choose the number of tournament dimensions along which an 
agent needs to win in order to win a prize. This is the framework analysed in this paper. 
In the analysis we focus on symmetric pure strategy equilibria with the particular 
property that the same effort is spread out along all dimensions of the contest.2 If the 
principal values the sum of agents’ effort along each dimension equally and 
independently, but has decreasing marginal benefits from the agents’ sum of efforts in 
each dimension, holding everything else equal, the principal would like agents to attribute 
                                                 
2 This is analogous to the procedure adopted by Klumpp and Polborn (2006) that they call Symmetric 
Uniform Campaign Equilibrium. 
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equal effort to each dimension. We focus on the type of equilibria which this principal, 
loosely speaking, likes most. 
In a contest with multiple dimensions, the principal may simply want to award one prize 
in each dimension, instead of one big prize. However, in some contexts, such as 
tournaments for promotion in internal labor markets, the prizes are indivisible and 
absolutely limited in number. Multi-tasking, compared to single-tasking, is then costly for 
the principal in the tournament context as well. We consider optimal contest design in 
such a framework, where the principal can optimize only along two design variables. 
Suppose that participants compete in n symmetric, mutually independent dimensions of 
output and effort, with a winner in each dimension being determined as in Tullock’s 
(1980) lottery contest.3 In the contest that we present in this paper, participants compete 
in a number of dimensions, and the winner must beat the opponent in at least some pre-
specified number. The problem is tractable for the case of identical players and equally 
important dimensions, for which we derive the symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
We present existence conditions for this equilibrium, and look at how the specification of 
the rule affects incentives to exert effort. We look at the optimal contest design from the 
point of view of maximizing effort (per dimension or totally). The standard Tullock 
contest is encompassed in our framework, and provides a natural point of comparison. 
The principal may specify a rule in which the winner must beat the opponent in a least k 
of these dimensions and may choose k to maximize his objective function. If 2k>n then 
this rule establishes that the winner must beat the opponent in the majority of the 
dimensions to win, with the size of the required majority increasing as k gets closer to n. 
In these cases there can be at most one winner, but there may be no winner at all. If the 
principal chooses k with n≥2k then a majority is not needed to win, and situations can 
arise in which one or both of the participants win a prize.  
The multi-tasking contest is a structure that is relevant in many contexts, where the 
choice of k or n may be a design problem in some context, like in sports tournaments, or 
in deliberately designed research tournaments, but may also be exogenously given in 
                                                 
3 For the microeconomic foundations of the contest success function used by Tullock see, inter alia, 
Skaperdas (1992, 1996), and Epstein and Nitzan (2006). 
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other contexts in which the decision is based on a whole set of relative performance 
measures, which have been discussed in the theory of contests more generally.4 Examples 
of applications of the model are 
i. committee decision making with n members: effort will then be interpreted as the 
amount of resources devoted to persuading each committee member. If k>0.5n 
then some type of majority is needed to reach a decision; if k=0.5(n+1) then a 
simple majority is sufficient, but decisions of a more fundamental nature – such 
as changes in constitution – may need a larger majority.5 This is also related to 
the literature on political competition (e.g. Congleton 1984, Snyder, 1989, 
Amegashie, 2002). 
ii. Beauty contest. In a competitive tendering situation, contestants are compared 
according to a number of criteria, and a winner is specified as the firm that beats 
the opponent in a pre-specified majority of these. As a labour market example, 
one could consider annual wage negotiations for employees in the Norwegian 
state. One possibility of achieving a wage increase is in a beauty contest with 
others at the same institution according to a list of difficult to measure criteria, 
such as environment-building, research results, and teaching quality. The prize is 
scarce (and not completely divisible in practice) since only a small proportion of 
the applicants are awarded a salary increase. 
iii. A model of sales. Consider two sales representatives with a list of n potential 
clients; the firm may use our contest structure to motivate effort by specifying a 
bonus to the seller with some pre-specified majority of sales. 
Section II presents the model and solves for the symmetric pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. The set of designs that satisfy the identified equilibrium is then investigated 
in Section III from the point of view of effort maximization. A brief conclusion follows 
in section IV. 
                                                 
4 Examples are litigation (Farmer and Pecorino 1999, Baye, Kovenock and deVries 2005), campaigning 
(Skaperdas and Grofman 1995), lobbying (Tullock 1980, 1988), or bribing games (Clark and Riis 2000).  
5 Hence our framework is a considerable extension of some of the analysis in Congleton (1984). 
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II. The model 
There are two risk neutral players who compete for a prize that they value at V by making 
irretrievable efforts at constant unit marginal cost. The effort of player i = 1, 2 is spread 
over n dimensions, and a player must win at least k of these dimensions in order to win 
the prize. Thus there are feasible contest designs in which both players may win the prize 
(n ≥2k), or in which there is a single winner or no winner. The effort of player 1 (2) in 
dimension j is given by xj (yj), j = 1, 2, …n, and the probability that player 1 wins 
dimension j takes a common form: 
jj
j
j yx
x
p
+
=       (1) 
if at least one effort is positive, and 2/1)1( =−= jj pp  if both players choose zero effort 
along this dimension. From (1) it is clear that the competitions to secure each dimension 
are independent of each other. Players decide upon their efforts simultaneously at the 
start of the game, and the outcome of each dimension is then determined by (1) and 
payoffs are then awarded accordingly. 
A key assumption of the analysis here is that a contestant can win at most one prize. The 
information available to the contest designer is very coarse; he observes only the identity 
of the contestant(s) that has (have) passed the criterion for the award of a prize. No finer 
grid of information is needed to implement the contest that we consider in this paper. 
Franckx et al (2004) state that a multi-task setting loses one of the advantages of 
contests/tournaments over other mechanisms, namely the limited informational 
requirement. Indeed, in their model the principal receives a signal in each of the 
competitive dimensions. In our model we retain the feature from single dimension 
contests, namely that the principal receives only information on the identity of the winner 
(rather than information specifying the winning margin in each dimension). 
In the model we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Let this symmetric 
pure strategy equilibrium be denoted by x* = y* = χ  = ),...,,( 21 nχχχ . Then, as is 
shown in the appendix, nχχχ === ...21  must hold. This makes room for a 
simplification of the expected payoff function that can be used to characterize the 
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equilibrium.6 We set up the dependence of the payoff for player 1 given that player 2 has 
a symmetric effort in all of the dimensions, and that player 1 has the same outlay in all 
dimensions but the first. We then differentiate this expression with respect to x1 and solve 
the first order condition for x1 to find the equilibrium. 
Given an expenditure x1 for player 1 in the first dimension, and a symmetric outlay χ for 
player 2 in all dimensions, and player 1 in all but the first, the probability that player 1 
wins none of the competitions is: 
)(2)(2)(
)0(
1
1
1
11
1
1
χ
χ
χχ
χ
+
=
+
=
+
=
−−−
=
=
∏
∏
xxyx
y
P nnn
n
n
j
jj
n
j
j
  (2) 
If player 1 wins exactly one of the dimensions, then it could either be dimension 1 with 
probability  
)(2 1
11
1
1
χχ
χ
+−−
−
x
x
nn
n
 
or it could be one of the other n-1 dimensions with probability 
)(2
)1(
1
11 χχ
χ
+
−
−− x
n
nn
n
. 
Hence the probability of winning exactly one of the dimensions is 
)(2
)1(
)(2
)1()1(
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
χ
χ
χχ
χχ
+
−+
=
+
−+
=
−−−
−
x
nx
x
nxP nnn
nn
   (3) 
Proceeding in this way, one can write the total probability of winning exactly j ≥ 2 
dimensions as: 
)(2
1
1
1
)(
1
11
1
1
χχ
χχ
+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
=
−−
−
x
j
n
x
j
n
jP nn
nn
 for j ≥ 2    (4) 
                                                 
6 The general form of the expected payoff function would involve a specification of all of the combinations 
of winning at least k of n trials, and the corresponding probabilities. 
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where 
)!(!
!
jnj
n
j
n
−
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛  is the formula for the number of combinations of j from n. There 
are ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
1
1
j
n
 combinations of j from n that involve winning dimension 1, and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
j
n 1
 that 
do not. Let ∑−
=
≡
1
0
)(
k
j
jPP be the probability that player 1 wins less than k of the dimensions. 
Then the dependence of 1’s payoff on his effort in dimension 1 is captured by: 
χχχπ )1()),(1(),( 1111 −−−−= nxVxPx     (5) 
Maximization of this expression by choice of x1 yields the following result: 
Proposition 1 
For contest design (n, k) a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium is characterized as 
follows. Each player’s effort in each dimension is 
11 2
1
1
)!()!1(2
)!1(),(
++
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
≡
−−
−
= nn
k
n
V
knk
Vnknχ     (6) 
The total effort for each player is nχ(n, k) which can be written as 
),(
2
),( 1 knk
nkVknn n Χ≡⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
+
χ . 
The equilibrium probability of winning is given by 
n
k
j j
n
knP
2
1),(
1
0
∑−
=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=  
and the equilibrium payoff is π(n, k)=P(n, k)V-nχ(n, k). 
A necessary condition for this equilibrium to exist is  
0
2
)2(
1
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Proof 
Differentiating (5) with respect to x1 and cancelling terms yields: 
1
)(2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
−
+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
=
∂
∂
−
V
x
k
n
x n χ
χ
π      (8) 
Setting (8) equal to zero and evaluating at a symmetric situation (x1=χ) yields the effort 
indicated in the Proposition. Differentiating (8) with respect to x1 and evaluating at the 
symmetric situation reveals that this effort maximizes 1’s expected profit (5). The 
expressions for the equilibrium probability of winning and the expected payoff follow 
directly. The existence condition in (7) secures a non-negative profit in equilibrium. 
QED 
The existence condition in (7) guarantees that the players achieve a non-negative profit in 
this equilibrium. Examination of this condition reveals that is sets limits for the 
relationship between the number of dimensions that must be won and the total number of 
dimensions in the competition. Intuitively, the probability of winning a prize in 
equilibrium must be large enough when weighed up against the total cost of effort; this 
means that n must be sufficiently large in relation to k. There does not seem to be a single 
relationship between n and k that satisfies (7), but Table 1 presents results of simulations 
of the existence condition for 20≥n≥1. Figure 1 presents numerical results for larger 
values of n. For a given n, k*(n) represents the maximum number of dimensions that 
must be won that is consistent with existence of the symmetric equilibrium. In Figure 1, 
contest designs on and below the line are commensurate with the equilibrium in 
Proposition 1. In the further analysis we shall refer to E as the set of contest designs that 
satisfy the criterion in (7). Table A1 in the appendix gives a summary of the designs that 
satisfy the existence condition in (7) for n≤20. 
Table 1 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
k*(n) 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 9 
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Figure 1: Relationship between the number of dimensions (n) and the maximum amount 
of dimensions that must be won for existence of equilibrium (k*(n)) 
Figure 1
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From Proposition 1 it can be noted that the contest design (1, 1) is the usual Tullock case, 
yielding an effort per player of χ(1, 1) = V/4. This contest design naturally satisfies the 
existence condition in (7). We now turn to the issue of how the pair Ekn ∈),(  affects the 
amount of effort expended in the contest. 
III. The optimal design 
Fixed k 
Suppose that the contest designer has specified a rule for how many dimensions a player 
must succeed in to win a prize. Given this k, we can calculate how the number of 
dimensions affects outlay per dimension, and the total outlay; furthermore we can 
calculate the k that maximizes these magnitudes within E. Holding k fixed and increasing 
the number of dimensions from n to n+1 has the following effect on effort per dimension, 
and the total effort: 
 11
)1()!1()!(2
)22()!1(),(),1( 2 +−−−
−−−
=−+
+ knkkn
nknVknkn nχχ     (9) 
)1()!1()!(2
)12()!1(),(),1()1( 2 +−−−
−−−
=−++
+ knkkn
nknnVknnknn nχχ    (10) 
From (9) it is clear that the change in effort per dimension is positive until n=2k-2 upon 
which the addition of another dimension (to 2k-1) does not change the effort, but further 
additions reduce the effort in each dimension. Equation (10) indicates that total effort 
increases in n until n=2k-1 upon which the addition of another dimension (to 2k) has no 
effect on the total effort; adding more dimensions than this reduces the total effort. 
We must, however, check whether these maxima actually exist, i.e. if the efforts are 
consistent with the equilibrium so that the considered designs are in set E. Define n*(k) as 
the minimum number of dimensions that must be present for the equilibrium to exist as 
defined by (7).7 For k=1, equilibrium exists for n≥1 so that n=2k-1 indeed maximizes 
effort per dimension, and n=2k-1 and n=2k maximizes their sum. For k=2 we have 
n*(2)=2 so that the designs that maximize efforts are feasible. For k=3 it is the case that 
n*(3)=2k-1 so that this is the design that maximizes effort per dimension; the maximal 
efforts for k=3 are consistent with equilibrium. For k≥4, the existence condition in (7) is 
not fulfilled at the n that maximizes efforts; hence n must be increased to the lowest level 
that is consistent with equilibrium (since efforts are decreasing in n in this region). The 
required n is thus n*(k). 
These results are summed up in Proposition 2, and in Table A1 in the appendix. 
Proposition 2 
Consider designs in set E and fix the number of dimensions that must be won to secure a 
prize at k. If k=1 then the effort per dimension is maximal for n=1, and the total effort is 
maximal for n=1 and n=2. If k = 2, the effort per dimension is maximized for n=2 and 
n=3, and the total effort per player is maximized for n=3 and n=4. For k=3, then the 
effort per dimension is maximized for n=5, and the total effort per player is maximized 
                                                 
7 This information can be read from Table 1 by looking at the first occurrence of a number in the second 
row and finding the value for n directly above this in the table: n*(1)=1, n*(2)=2, n*(3)=5, n*(4)=8 etc. 
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for n=5 and n=6. These are all unconstrained maxima. For k≥4, only the constrained 
maximum is attainable; total effort and the effort per dimension is maximized for n=n*(k). 
Given the designs in set E, if only a single dimension must be won, then efforts per 
dimension and total effort are maximized for the standard Tullock contest design with 
competition in a single dimension. Adding further dimensions increases the chances of 
winning for a given effort and this makes the competitors reduce their effort and cost in 
each dimension. Adding a second dimension reduces output in each but does not affect 
the total. Hence the Tullock contest yields an equivalent total effort to the design (2, 1); 
the former only permits one winner, while the latter permits up to two. If a prize is 
awarded to a contestant that wins at least two dimensions, then the designs (2, 2) and (3, 
2) yield the maximal effort per dimension and the designs (3, 2) and (4, 2) maximize the 
total effort. For k=2 then one can conclude that the design (3, 2) is optimal in the sense 
that it maximizes both definitions of effort and secures that only a single prize is awarded. 
When k=3 the corresponding optimal design is (5, 3) for the same reason. 
For larger values of k, the existence condition constrains the maximum, so that the lowest 
n that is consistent with equilibrium maximizes efforts. Numerical simulations have 
shown that for k≥4, n*(k) can be written in the form n*(k)=2k+i where i≥0 and i 
increases periodically as k increases.8 This means that in order to maximize effort in the 
contest requires contest designs that potentially permit two winners. As the number of 
successes needed to win gets larger, the probability of winning for a given effort gets 
reduced; to balance this, the number of dimensions in the contest must be increased. To 
ensure existence it must be potentially possible for both players to win a prize. 
For designs in E, maximizing effort per dimension gives rise to the emergence of a 
specific pattern when k is fixed; when faced with a choice between a single prize and a 
two-prize system, it is optimal for the principal to instigate the single-prize structure if 
this is in E. If only two-prize systems are commensurate with equilibrium then the lowest 
possible n is chosen. To maximize total effort the division between the prize systems is 
not so sharp; in cases where it is feasible to implement a single- and a two-prize system, 
                                                 
8 It does not appear that the period is constant, nor does it follow a specific pattern, however. It is for this 
reason that we present numerical results. 
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then the highest n that gives a single prize and the lowest value that involves two prizes 
both maximize total effort. 
Fixed n 
In many applications it is the number of dimensions in the competition that will be fixed 
at n; how should the contest designer set the number of successes on which to base the 
awarding of the prize? Treating k as a continuous variable, the sign of kkn ∂∂ ),(χ  is the 
same as the sign of (n-2k+1); hence this function reaches its maximum at k=0.5(n+1). 
When n is odd then this maximum can be reached exactly if the equilibrium exists, but 
when n is even, the efforts to either side of this k are maximal since k is an integer. This 
can also be seen directly since the sign of the change in effort (and total effort since n is 
fixed here) is given by 
11 2
)2(
1
!)!(2
)2()!1(),()1,(
++
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
=
−
−−
=−+ nn
kn
k
n
V
kkn
knnVknkn χχ    (11) 
so that effort is increased by adding more dimensions if k<0.5n. The change is zero 
between k=0.5n and k=0.5n+1, and negative thereafter. Since the number of dimensions 
n is fixed, designs in E that maximize effort per dimension will also maximize effort in 
sum. However, the unconstrained maximum can only be achieved if the design satisfies 
(7). Referring to Table A1 in the appendix, we see that for n={1,3,4,5,6,8,10} there is a 
single k in each case that achieves the unconstrained effort maximum. From Table 1 and 
Table A1 it is apparent that the maximizing k in each of these cases is k*(n). When n=2 
both k=1 and k=k*(n)=2 give the same maximum effort level. For n={7,9} and n≥11, the 
condition in (7) constrains candidates for k that maximize effort. Since ),( knχ  can easily 
be verified to be a function that is strictly concave in k and that is symmetric around its 
maximum, k in these cases should be as large as (7) allows to achieve the constrained 
maximum. The largest possible k in each case is k*(n).  
Proposition 3 sums up this set of results. 
 14
Proposition 3 
Suppose that n is fixed. For designs in E, effort per dimension and aggregate effort are 
maximized for k=k*(n); for n=2 the maximum can also be achieved for k=k*(2)-1(=1). 
For n={1,3,4,5,6,8,10} the unconstrained maximum can be achieved. For other n, 
equation (7) constrains the maximum that can be attained.  
From Table 1 we see that for n≥6, k*(n)<0.5n, and numerical simulations confirm this for 
larger n. Hence the effort maximizing choice of k in these contests is such that there must 
be the possibility that there can be two winners. For n=6, for instance, efforts are 
maximized for k*(6)=3 so that two winners occur if each wins half of the dimensions. As 
n grows, the potential for two winners must increase for the constrained maximum for 
effort to be consistent with equilibrium; k*(50)=21 for example, so that there are many 
outcomes of the 50 dimensions in which both players will receive a prize.  
Similar to the discussion around Proposition 2, there is a divide between single-prize 
systems and those that involve potentially two prizes. For a given n, k should be 
increased until a single-prize design is achieved. If this is not feasible then the largest 
available k should be chosen to minimize the probability that two prizes actually have to 
be awarded. 
The figures in Table A1 in the appendix, together with Propositions 2 and 3 indicate that 
- for the designs in E - total effort can always be increased by increasing the size of the 
contest (i.e. simultaneous increases in n and k). This gives more total effort, but spread 
increasingly thinly across all dimensions. This leads to the following result: 
Proposition 4 
Let n  be the largest possible value of n. Within E, to maximize total effort in the contest, 
the principal should choose the design ))(*,( nkn . To maximize effort per dimension, the 
design (1,1) should be chosen. 
Proposition 4 can be used to help explain the conundrum posed by Tullock (1988) that 
theoretical models predict more rent-seeking activity than is observed in practice. As 
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analysts, we may only observe the identity of the winner of a contest, and have often 
assumed that this has resulted from competition in a single dimension. A principal 
wanting to maximize total effort, however, will prefer a large contest with competition in 
several dimensions; the theoretical model from the one-dimensional case will overstate 
the true amount of rent-seeking. 
IV. Conclusion 
The standard Tullock model of a contest has seen many applications and extensions. The 
limited amount of information needed by the principal to implement such an incentive 
system has made this structure popular in applied work also. When several effort 
dimensions are considered, one immediately opens up for many possibilities regarding 
the information known by the principal, and how this translates into a winning competitor. 
In this paper we have used a framework that is as close to the original as possible, given 
the extension of multiple effort dimensions. The information assumed available to the 
principal here can be very coarse – as in the Tullock model – consisting only of a number 
of dimensions won by each competitor; in addition, and again in common with the 
Tullock framework, the prizes are fixed in size. The optimal designs that we have 
presented ultimately rest on these assumptions. If the prizes are divisible and the principal 
knows which competitor has won each dimension, then he may design an incentive 
scheme that rewards competitors accordingly. If information is available on the winning 
margin in each dimension, then this may further be built in to the incentive scheme. We 
believe that these types of contests should be investigated in future work. However, one 
should bear in mind that the complexity of the contest will likely increase its 
administration cost. Our analysis has been an attempt to open up the multi-task issue in 
contests, while at the same time preserving the main advantage if this type of structure: 
simplicity. 
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Appendix  
We show the following 
Lemma If x and y with x = y are the effort vectors that characterize a symmetric 
equilibrium in pure strategies, then jjii xyyx ===  for all ji,  in {1,2,...,n}. 
For a proof, note first that a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies cannot have zero 
effort along all dimensions if the prize has a strictly positive value, as each contestant can 
increase the probability for winning the prize from some probability strictly smaller than 
1 to 1 by an infinitely small amount of effort. 
Note further that different effort along different dimensions can also not be an 
equilibrium. We show this by way of a contradiction. Consider a candidate equilibrium  
x = y = χ with 11 yx =  < 22 xy = and 1x  > 0 (the case 01 =x  can be treated along similar 
lines) in a contest with n dimensions and a requirement to win at least 2≥k  dimensions 
in order to win a prize. Let )( ikp −  be the probability that player 1 wins ik −  of the 
contests along the dimensions 3,4,...n. The outcome in the contests along dimensions 1 
and 2 are payoff relevant for player 1 only if the outcome can increase the number of 
dimensions which the player wins from below k to k or above. Accordingly, the candidate 
equilibrium can be an equilibrium only if there is no reallocation of the effort 21 xx +  
between the two dimensions 1 and 2 by which the player can increase his overall 
probability of winning at least k contests. Hence, a necessary condition for the candidate 
to constitute an equilibrium is that 
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cannot be increased, for instance, by a small increase 21 dxdx −=  > 0. The impact of such 
a shift of effort is 
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Evaluating this term at 11 yx =  and 22 yx =  reduces it to   
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xx
. 
Accordingly, each of these terms is positive if 1x  < 2x . As this contradicts the optimality 
of the strategy x in the candidate equilibrium, the efforts must be distributed uniformly 
across all dimensions in a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. 
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Contest designs that satisfy (7), i.e Ekn ∈),(  (for n≤20) 
Table A1 
 
Combinations of k and n that do not satisfy (7) are denoted by -. The first figure in each 
cell is effort per player per dimension, and the second is total effort per player for some 
example designs. 
k,n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 111213 14151617181920
1 
4
1,
4
1
4
1,
8
1
 16
3,
16
1
8
1,
32
1
64
5,
64
1
64
3,
128
1
             
2 - 
4
1,
8
1
 8
3,
8
1
 8
3,
32
3
16
5,
16
1
              
3 - - - - 
32
15,
32
3
32
15,
64
5
             
4 - - - - - - -
512
280,
512
35
           
5 - - - - - - - - -
2048
1260,
2048
126
 
          
6 - - - - - - - - - - - -         
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -    
8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
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